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I. INTRODUCTION
The General Assembly, as part of its 1983 revision of Missouri trust law,'
enacted several provisions which empower the courts to authorize deviations
from the terms of a private trust.2 Most of these provisions concern administrative deviation-upon an appropriate showing the court may remove restrictions on the trustee's managerial or administrative powers, such as conferring
the power to sell, mortgage, or improve trust property, or broadening the
range of permissible trust investments. 3 One subsection of the new statutes,
*
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1. 1983 Mo. Laws 785.
2. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 456.570-.590 (Supp. 1984).
3. Administrative deviation is authorized by Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 456.570.1,
.580, .590.1 (Supp. 1984). Section 456.570.1 authorizes the court, after notice to affected parties and "upon cause shown," to "relieve a trustee from any restrictions on
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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however, empowers the courts to permit a trustee to deviate from the distribuhis power that would otherwise be placed upon him by the trust or by this chapter."
The apparent purpose of this provision is to overturn Missouri's restrictive approach to
administrative deviation. The inference could be drawn from conflicting decisions that
Missouri courts would never authorize an act not expressly or impliedly permitted by
the terms of the trust. MISSOURI BAR, MISSOURI PROBATE UPDATE AND NEW GUARDIAN AND TRUST CODES-1983, 163-64 (J. Borron ed. 1983). In contrast, the majority

approach allows the court to direct or permit the trustee to do acts which are not
authorized or are forbidden by the terms of the trust "if owing to circumstances not
known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance [with administrative
terms] would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959). See generally Scott, Deviations from the Terms of a Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1025 (1931). Accordingly, it appears that the "for cause" standard of § 456.570.1, which does not explicitly require a
change of circumstances unforeseen by the settlor as a prerequisite to court action, is at
least as broad as the Restatement rule, and may permit administrative deviation whenever strict compliance with the administrative terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair accomplishment of the settlor's purposes. Sullivan, Modification, Revocation and Termination in MISSOURI GUARDIANSHIP AND TRUST LAW 10-5 to 10-6
(1985).
Section 456.590.1 certainly goes farther than the Restatement rule, as it permits
the court to confer on trustees any administrative power necessary to conduct a transaction that "is in the opinion of the court expedient." This broad deviation authority is
taken directly from English legislation, the Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.19, §
57. MIssouRI BAR, supra at 164. The English courts' construction of this statute is
discussed in 48 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Trusts para. 913 (4th ed. 1984), and
38 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND Trusts 180-82 (3d ed. 1972). In particular, the

"expedient" criterion requires that the deviation be beneficial to the trust as a whole,
not merely to the interest of one beneficiary. Re Craven's Estate, [1937] Ch. 431 (advance to enable life tenant to become an underwriting member of Lloyd's insurance
group denied).
Section 465.580 is responsive to a different administrative problem. It may be im-

possible to make a trust reasonably productive of income where the corpus is an interest in land of uncertain duration (i.e., a life estate, determinable, or defeasible fee),
because the trustee is unable to sell or mortgage the land, grant a long-term lease, or
make improvements. In this circumstance, the court is to authorize the needed fee simple mortgage or conveyance, long-term lease, or improvement, unless the owners of
future interests in the land would be injured thereby. Sale proceeds are required to be
held in trust for the beneficial owners of all present and future interests in the land.
This statute was enacted to eliminate a narrow interpretation of the partition statute,
Mo. REV. STAT. § 528.010 (1978), to the effect that a court may authorize sale of
unimproved land in which there are future interests only if the land otherwise does not
produce enough income to pay the taxes. See Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 DUKE L.J. 517, 538-42. Application of
the new statute, accordingly, is not conditioned on a finding that the present estate in
the land is "burdensome and unprofitable." Mo. REV. STAT. § 528.010 (1978). Al-

though codified in the trust law, the new statute actually authorizes equitable partition
even where no trust is involved (i.e., where the holder of the uncertain-duration present
interest is not a trustee). MISSOURI BAR, supra at 162. Accord, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17,

§ 1687.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) as amended by Act of Sept. 16, 1985, P.A. 84-443,
1985 I1. Legis. Serv. 575 (West).
Finally, it should be noted that this new administrative deviation legislation will
not be used frequently, for the simple reason that Missouri's 1983- trust law revision
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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tive terms of the trust.4 In circumstances where such distributive variation is
authorized, the court may alter the size of the beneficiaries' interests, change
the time of payment, or even terminate the trust prior to the time specified by
the settlor. 5

In sanctioning judicially-approved early trust termination the new legislation repeals, at least in part, the Claflin doctrine-the judge-made rule in
force in most American states that a trust cannot be terminated, even with the
consent of all beneficiaries, prior to the date specified by the trust's terms
where continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of
the settlor.6 After a brief discussion of the Claflin doctrine and its defects, this
article will examine three interpretive questions raised by the new legislation.7
The courts' answers to these questions will determine the extent to which the
variation of trusts statute overturns the Claflin doctrine. And in resolving these
interpretive issues Missouri courts will be making fundamental choices about
the purpose and role of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.8

included enactment of the Uniform Trustee Powers Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 456.500.540, 456.560-.570, 456.600 (Supp. 1984). Under section 3 of that act, id. § 456.520,
extremely broad administrative powers are conferred by operation of law, even if the
trust was established before enactment. Id. § 456.600. Accordingly, expansion of trustees' administrative powers should be required only where the trust instrument expressly
limits the broad powers conferred by law. See id. § 456.510.1.
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Supp. 1984). See generally Haskell, Justifying the Principleof DistributiveDeviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 267
(1967).

5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Supp. 1984).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959); 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 337 (3d ed. 1967); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 1008 (rev. 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]. The Claflin
doctrine received its name from the Massachusetts decision which gave birth to the
principle, Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). Missouri is among the
large majority of states that followed Claflin. Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank of Kansas
City, 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956); Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S.W.2d 644
(1931); Owen v. Gilchrist, 304 Mo. 330, 263 S.W. 423 (1924); Hamilton v. Robinson,
236 Mo. App. 289, 151 S.W.2d 504 (1941); Easton v. Demuth, 179 Mo. App. 722, 162
S.W. 294 (1914); cf. Smith v. Smith, 70 Mo. App. 448 (1897) (early termination refused because it would frustrate purpose of trust, but in addition consent could not be
obtained from unascertained principal beneficiaries).
The Claflin doctrine is the analog of the rule that a trust may always be terminated with the consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 338 (1959). Once the settlor has died he cannot consent. By refusing to
terminate a trust where there is any unfulfilled material purpose the courts are, in
effect, attempting to infer from the trust instrument and surrounding circumstances
whether or not the settlor would have agreed to early termination.
7.

See infra notes 29-66 and accompanying text.

8.

See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
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DIScussIoN

The Claflin Doctrine and its Defects

Claflin v. Claflin9 established a uniquely American rule of equity. On the
authority of Saunders v. Vautier,20 the courts of England and the Commonwealth nations have consistently held that a trust may be terminated at any
time if all beneficiaries consent, without regard to whether premature termination would in some measure frustrate the accomplishment of the settlor's purposes in setting up the trust."' Of course, if any trust beneficiary is unborn or
incapable of giving a legally-binding consent, as in the case of a minor or
disabled person, for example, agreement among the remaining beneficiaries
will not discharge the trust. Until the Massachusetts court's 1889 decision in
Claflin, American jurisdictions generally followed the English precedent.1 2
The English approach limits the settlor's ability to restrict or condition
the beneficiaries' enjoyment of the trust estate. The original decisions, however, were not founded upon a preference for giving beneficiaries greater control over the disposition of their interests. Instead, they proceed from the view
that there is an inherent inconsistency between the equitable absolute ownership granted the sole beneficiary of a trust and the settlor's attempt to withhold possession of the property beyond attainment of the age of majority. This
supposed repugnancy was resolved by holding void the settlor's instruction to
postpone enjoyment by the sole beneficiary, thereby treating the trust as granting unrestricted equitable fee or absolute ownership interest in the corpus.1 3
The Claflin court found itself "unable to see that the directions of the
testator to the trustees [to postpone payment of principal and income beyond
the sole beneficiary's attaining majority] are against public policy, or are so
far inconsistent with the rights of property given to the plaintiff that they
should not be carried into effect. 1 4 In jurisdictions that follow Claflin the
9. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). In Claflin the testator's will and codicil
provided that his residuary estate should be held in trust, with one-third of the trust
fund to be paid to testator's minor son in three installments: $10,000 at age twenty-one,
$10,000 at age twenty-five, and the balance at age thirty. Upon attaining the age of
majority the son brought a bill in equity petitioning the court for an immediate transfer
of the remainder of his interest in the trust estate. Id. at 21, 20 N.E. at 455.
10. 4 Beav. 115, aff'd, Cr. & Ph. 240 (1841).
11. E.g., 48 HALSEURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Trusts para. 637 (4th ed. 1984).
12. E.g., J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION § 114-24 (1st ed. 1883); J. TIFFANY & E. BULLARD, THE LAW OF'TRUsTS AND TRUSTEES 863 (1862).
13. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, afid, Cr. & Ph. 240 (1841); see Claflin v.
Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 22, 20 N.E. 454, 455 (1889); J. GRAY, supra note 12, §§ 105112a; BOGERT, supra note 6, at 412. Accordingly, the English approach to trust termination was founded upon a fallacious reification of the concept of property. See, e.g., B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-28 & nn.2-3 (1977). This
is not to deny that the effects of the English rule may make it preferable to the Claflin
doctrine. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
14. 149 Mass. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456. In perceiving no inconsistency in a rehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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courts feel free to give effect to the settlor's intentions, as best they can.
The differing approaches of the English and American courts were nicely
summarized by Professor Austin Wakeman Scott.
The American courts have laid emphasis on the idea that the wishes of
the settlor should be controlling except where it would be opposed to some
definite policy to give effect to his desires. In England, on the other hand, the
courts have felt that, although the extent of the interests of the beneficiaries
depends upon the intention of the settlor, the control of their interests should
be in their own hands, except where the interests of others limit such control.
In the United States the courts take the view that the settlor can dispose of
his property as he likes. In England the beneficiary of a trust can dispose of
his interest as he likes. These different points of view appear in the attitude of
the courts of the two countries toward spendthrift trusts. As we have seen, the
English courts have consistently held that the settlor cannot make the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust inalienable by them, whereas a great majority of the American courts have permitted the settlor to impose such a restraint on alienation. Similarly the courts in the two countries have reached
different results where the question is one of the power of the beneficiaries to
terminate the trust. In England the beneficiaries, if they all consent and are
all sui juris, can at any time terminate the trust, even though the purposes for
which the trust was created by the settlor have not been fully accomplished.
The trust property belongs beneficially to them alone, and they have power to
control its disposition. On the other hand, in the United States the wishes of
the settlor in creating the trust are paramount to the wishes of the beneficiaries. Even though the beneficiaries all consent and are all sui juris, they
cannot compel the termination of the trust if such termination would run
counter to the intention of the settlor in creating the trust. 15

Whether the wishes of the settlor or of the beneficiaries should be treated as
paramount in the matter of trust termination requires an evaluation of competing intergenerational claims to the control of resources. This evaluation will
be deferred until Missouri's new resolution of this intergenerational competition is explored.'
The Claflin doctrine has been the subject of much criticism and the object
of some legislative tinkering in other states. A brief review of these criticisms
will serve to put the new variation of trusts statute in perspective, by indicating whether Missouri has reformed or repudiated Claflin.
Two types of problems arise in the application of the Claflin doctrine.
First, it is often quite difficult to determine whether the settlor was possessed
of some "material purpose" that would be frustrated by early termination of
the trust. Some cases are easy. Clearly, if a beneficiary's interest is subject to
stricted equitable fee, American courts avoided the logical fallacy which trapped their
English brethren, see supra note 13, but the conclusion that such restrictions are not

against public policy may have been too readily accepted. See infra notes 85-95 and
accompanying text.
15. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 337, at 2655-56 (footnote omitted).
16. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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a spendthrift restriction, the restraint on alienation manifests an intention to
protect the beneficiary from his own improvidence.1 7 Similarly, a support trust
should not be terminated in advance of the date specified by its terms because
it is quite properly inferred that the settlor intended to secure a reliable source
of support for the income beneficiary, which could be jeopardized by mismanagement or improvidence if the fund is transferred to the beneficiary. 18 Likewise, a discretionary trust is created because the settlor wishes to rely on the
trustee's judgment concerning the beneficiaries' needs and capacities, and that
ongoing independent evaluation would be eliminated if agreement among the
beneficiaries were sufficient to terminate the trust.29 Finally, as in the Claflin
case itself, where there is a trust for the benefit of a sole beneficiary with
payment of principal postponed to a designated age beyond the age of majority, it is clear that the settlor desired to keep the principal out of the hands of
20
the beneficiary until the date specified.
The difficulty in deciding whether early termination would defeat a material purpose of the settlor arises where a trust for successive beneficiaries is
created without spendthrift restrictions. Professor Scott described the dilemma
as follows:
If the only purpose in creating the trust was to preserve the principal of the
trust estate during the life of the income beneficiary so that it might ultimately be enjoyed by the remainderman, it would not defeat the purpose of
the trust to terminate it before the death of the life beneficiary if both of the
beneficiaries should desire to terminate it or if one of them should acquire the
entire beneficial interest. On the other hand, if it was also a material purpose
of the settlor to protect the life beneficiary against his own possible mismanagement of the property, the termination of the trust before his death would
defeat this purpose, even though the remainderman should consent to the termination or the
life beneficiary should acquire the interest of the
1
remainderman.2
17. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at § 337.2.
18. Id. at § 337.4. A support trust is a trust the terms of which provide that the
trustee shall pay or apply only so much of the income or principal as is necessary for
the education or support of the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154
(1959). Thus ifS transfers $100,000 to T in trust "to pay the income annually to B, to
be used for his support, and on the death of B, to pay the principal to R," the settlor
has expressed only her motive for the transfer; it is not a support trust. But if the
instrument provides that the trustee is "to pay so much of the income annually to B as
is necessary for his support," then the limitation on B's interest establishes a trust for
support. In most states, the beneficiary's interest in a support trust is inalienable-in
effect, support trusts are treated as spendthrift trusts by implication-which supplies
an additional reason for refusing early termination. Id.
19. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 6, at § 337.4. A trust is discretionary if its terms
provide that the trustee shall pay to or apply for a beneficiary only so much of the
income or principal as the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall determine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959).
20. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 6, § 337.3.
21. Id. § 337.1, at 2663.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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While the prevailing view is that the mere fact that successive interests have
been created does not sufficiently indicate a "material purpose" to withhold
management from the income beneficiary, resort may be had to other language in the trust instrument and even to extrinsic evidence to demonstrate
the existence of such a purpose.22
The second problem with the Claflin doctrine is that it is frequently ineffectual, if not counterproductive. Absent spendthrift restraint, a beneficiary
can always accelerate or anticipate his interest by sale, notwithstanding the
settlor's purpose to postpone enjoyment or withhold management. To prevent
complete evasion of the Claflin doctrine, American courts hold that a purchaser of the beneficiaries' interests also cannot compel early termination, even
though the settlor had no purpose to protect a stranger; instead, the purchaser
must await payment according to the trust terms.2 3 Where less than all interests in the trust are sold, the purchaser will pay a price discounted for deferral
and any actuarial risks, yet these same considerations would control division of
the corpus upon agreement of the beneficiaries, were termination permitted.
Thus, early termination is denied, but the economic equivalent may be available on sale, even if all beneficiaries do not consent! If the market for trust
interests is too thin, however, the beneficiary may have to make a sacrifice
sale.24 Accordingly, if the trust is not spendthrift, anticipation cannot be prevented, it is at most penalized.25 For this reason, one commentator has recommended that the material purpose doctrine be limited to spendthrift trusts,
because "a decree denying termination in the spendthrift trust cases cannot be
circumvented by a sale of the beneficial interest."26
22. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 comments e, f, & g (1959);
Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living and Dead Hands-Too Many Fingersin the
Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 563, 583-85 (1985).
23. The Claflin court foresaw this issue, but refused to decide it. 149 Mass. at
24, 20 N.E. at 456; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 comment k (1959).
Professor John Chipman Gray, writing shortly after Claflin was decided, predicted this
extension of the rule. J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION § 124n (2d. ed. 1895).
24. Moxley v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 27 Cal. 2d 457, 472, 165 P.2d 15,
23 (1946) (Traynor, J., dissenting); BOGERT, supra note 6, at 419; RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 381 comment a (1944); Bird, supra note 22, at 582. In England, there is
an established auction market for the sale of future interests, but no similar market has
developed in the United States, apparently because many interests in trust are inaliena-

ble. J.

DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 550-51 (3d ed.

1984).
25. The existence or amount of the "penalty," however, bears no logical relationship to the extent of disruption to the settlor's plan. For example, it should be
possible to liquidate the interest of a sole beneficiary under a trust providing for distribution of principal at age 30 (as in Claflin) for an amount approximating the current

market value of the trust assets despite the obvious disruption of the settlor's plan,

because there are no contingencies and the present value of all future income and principal payments to the purchaser should equal the current value of the corpus (assuming
broad investment powers and a competent trustee).
26. Bird, supra note 22, at 587 (this recommendation was part of a background
study prepared for the California Law Revision Commission, id. at 563). Again, the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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The practical unenforceability of the material purpose doctrine, as applied to alienable beneficial interests, has another aspect. Because a trustee
cannot be held liable for an act or omission in breach of trust to which the
beneficiary has consented, the trustee might, with adequate inducement and a
written release from all beneficiaries, agree to a voluntary termination of the
trust.2 7 Thus, instead of selling their interests, the beneficiaries can purchase
the trustee's consent to termination.28
B.

Interpretive Issues in Distributive Deviation

With this introduction to the problems inherent in the Claflin doctrine, it
is now possible to assess the scope of Missouri's new distributive deviation statute. Section 456.590.2 of the Revised Statutes provides:
When all of the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent, the court
may, upon finding that such variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn,
and unascertained beneficiaries, vary the terms of a private trust so as to reduce or eliminate the interests of some beneficiaries and increase those of
others, to change the times or amounts of payments and distributions to beneficiaries, or to provide for termination of the trust at a time earlier or later
29
than that specified by the terms.
Other than naming new beneficiaries, the courts are given discretionary power
to rewrite the distributive terms of the trust, subject only to two conditions:
(1) all adult beneficiaries who are not disabled must consent to the variation;
Claflin court recognized this possible distinction, but observed: "It is true that the
plaintiff's interest is alienable by him, and can be taken by his creditors to pay his
debts, but it does not follow that, because the testator has not imposed all possible
restrictions, the restrictions which he has imposed should not be carried into effect."
149 Mass. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456.
27. 4 A. SCOTT,supra note 6, § 342; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 342
(1959). The beneficiary of a spendthrift trust cannot compel the trustee to convey the
trust property to him or to some other person at his direction, and there is some authority that if the trustee does in fact convey the property the beneficiary is precluded by
his consent from holding the trustee liable. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 6, § 342.1. Yet this
result is criticized by Professor Scott, id., and rejected by the Second Restatement.
Compare RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 342(2) (1935) (trustee liable notwithstanding
spendthrift beneficiary's consent) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 342 comment f (1959) (trustee not liable). If consent bars subsequent liability to the spendthrift
beneficiary, even a restraint on alienation can be avoided by offering the trustee sufficient inducement to make the conveyance.
28. Professor William F. Fratcher observed, in commenting on Thomson v.
Union Nat'l Bank of Kansas City, 291 S.W. 2d 178 (Mo. 1956), that:
The real effect of the Claflin rule is to enable the trustee to set its own
price for consent to termination. It may not be merely a coincidence that the
rise and spread of the Claflin rule has been contemporaneous with the rise
and spread of trust companies, engaged in the business of administering trusts
for profit, which do not like to be deprived of their anticipated fees.
Fratcher, Trusts and Succession, 22 Mo. L. REV. 390, 393 (1957); see BOGERT, supra
note 6, at 419.
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Supp. 1984).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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and (2) the court must be satisfied that the change will "benefit" disabled,
minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries. In particular, a finding that
the proposed change will not defeat a material purpose of the settlor is not
required.
Three interpretive issues will determine the extent of the innovation
wrought by this statute. First, does a court have jurisdiction to approve a proposed variation where all adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent and
there are no disabled, minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries of the
trust? Second, in determining whether disabled, minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries will "benefit," will the court, mindful of the settlor's
desires, find the requisite benefit only if the proposed change is consistent with
the purposes underlying any restrictions, conditions, or limitations imposed by
the settlor? Third, will the courts take into account the material purposes of
the settlor in the exercise of their discretion? Each of these issues will be addressed inturn.
1. All Beneficiaries Are Consenting Adults
It could be argued that the new statute allows the courts to approve a
trust variation even where there are no disabled, minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries because, in this instance, the statute should be construed
to impose only one condition on the judiciary's discretionary authority--consent of all adult beneficiaries who are not disabled. So construed, the
legislation would take a long stride toward the English rule of Saunders v.
Vautier, that the beneficiaries by agreement among themselves may compel
termination without regard to the settlor's purposes. 30 Unlike the English rule,
however, Missouri would require judicial approval of the variation, and a
court's discretionary authority to refuse variation could be used to supervise
the consensual arrangements of the beneficiaries.
Recall that a trust can be terminated by agreement of all beneficiaries if
the settlor's purposes will not be undermined. Thus, where the binding consent
of all beneficiaries can be obtained the judicial imprimatur is needed only if
(1) the trust is spendthrift, or (2) the beneficiaries want to avoid the loss attendant upon self-help evasion of the Claflin doctrine (sacrifice sale or trustee
extortion). There is no apparent reason why the adult beneficiaries should suffer such a loss in circumstances where the court would grant the change if any
protected beneficiary were interested in the trust.
The failure of section 456.590.2 to provide explicitly that a variation may
be approved where all beneficiaries are consenting adults may be attributable
to an oversight in legislative drafting. Section 456.590.2 is derived from English legislation, 31 the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958.32 That legislation contem30.
31.
32.

See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
MISSOURi BAR, supra note 3, at 164 (J. Borron ed. 1983).
6 & 7 EIiz. 2, ch. 53. Section 1(1) of the Act provides:

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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plates judicial approval only on behalf of beneficiaries who are incapacitated,
minor, unborn, or unascertained, for the simple reason that under the rule of
Saunders v. Vautier, if all of the beneficiaries of a trust are in existence and
sui juris, then upon agreement they are entitled to termination-judicial approval is not required.
While section 456.590.2 seems to assume the existence of some disabled,
minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiary, the judicial power to "vary the
terms of a private trust" is not expressly conditioned on the presence of such a
beneficiary. This is in contrast to the English legislation, under which the
court is granted discretionary power to "approve [the proposed variation] on
behalf of" protected beneficiaries. 33 As no reason appears why variation should
be denied if all beneficiaries are consenting adults, the ambiguity in the Missouri legislation should be resolved by treating the finding of a benefit to protected beneficiaries, not as a general limitation on the courts' distributive variation jurisdiction, but as an additional condition on the exercise of that
jurisdiction where such beneficiaries are present.3 4
1.-(1) Where property, whether real or personal, is held on trusts arising,
whether before or after the passing of this Act, under any will, settlement or
other disposition, the court may if it thinks fit by order approve on behalf
of(a) any person having, directly or indirectly, an interest, whether
vested or contingent, under the trusts who by reason of infancy or
other incapacity is incapable of assenting, or
(b) any person (whether ascertained or not) who may become entitled,
directly or indirectly, to an interest under the trusts as being at a
future date or on the happening of a future event a person of any
specified description or a member of any specified class of persons,
so however that this paragraph shall not include any person who
would be of that description, or a member of that class, as the case
may be, if the said date had fallen or the said event had happened
at the date of the application to the court, or
(c) any person unborn, or
(d) any person in respect of any discretionary interest of his under protective trusts where the interest of the principal beneficiary has not
failed or determined,
any arrangement (by whomsoever proposed, and whether or not there is any
other person beneficially interested who is capable of assenting thereto) varying or revoking all or any of the trusts, or enlarging the powers of the trustees
of managing or administering any of the property subject to the trusts:
Provided that except by virtue of paragraph (d) of this subsection the
court shall not approve an arrangement on behalf of any person unless the
carrying out thereof would be for the benefit of that person.
See generally McClean, Variation of Trusts in England and Canada,43 CAN. B. REv.
181, 227-61 (1965); Harris, Ten Years of Variation of Trusts (pts. 1 & 2), 33 CoNy.
& PROP, LAW. (n.s.) 113, 183 (1969).
33. Id. See Re Viscount Hambleden's Will Trusts, [1960] 1 All E.R. 353 (order
of variation under the English statute is not necessary because court's approval on behalf of minors and others ipso facto alters the trust). But see Re Joseph's Will Trusts,
[19591 3 All E.R. 475.
34. The court would then be construing section 456.590.2 as if it stated: "When
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If so construed, what standards should be used by the court in the exercise of its discretionary authority to approve an arrangement among consenting adult beneficiaries? It is submitted that the standards should be the
same as those applied where there is a protected beneficiary. As more fully
explained below, two alternative guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion seem reasonable. Approval could be granted if the variation secures some
advantage for the beneficiaries that was not anticipated by the settlor and the
court is persuaded that the settlor, if faced with the question, would have decided that the advantage justifies the resulting interference with some "material purpose" of the trust.3 5 Under this approach a change would be made only
if a discriminating evaluation of the settlor's overall dispositive plan reveals
that the change better serves the settlor's priorities and objectives than
mechanical adherence to the trust terms. Alternatively, the court could use its
discretionary authority to approve those changes which the court concludes,
based on its own independent evaluation of the needs and capabilities of the
trust beneficiaries, are in the best interest of the beneficiaries.3" Under this
approach disruption of the settlor's dispositive plan would not weigh against
the approval of the variation.
To summarize, adult beneficiaries could submit their desired changes for
judicial approval if the Missouri legislation is construed as suggested here.
Such an oversight or veto power over the consensual arrangements of competent adult beneficiaries is admittedly paternalistic, and the question becomes
whether a judge's paternalism should be substituted for the settlor's own, possibly idiosyncratic, paternalism. Of course, if all beneficiaries are consenting
adults and their interests are alienable (i.e., the trust is not spendthrift) they
can always have their own way, but the price of individualism will be whatever
losses are incurred in evading Claflin.
2. On the Meaning of "Benefit"
a. In General
Whether or not the Missouri courts will construe their new jurisdiction to
vary trusts as extending to situations where all beneficiaries are in existence
and sui juris, the core content of the statute is the authority to order modification or termination where such action is in the interest of disabled, minor,
unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries. In this situation, the prerequisite to
variation is a judicial finding that the change will benefit the persons whose
interests the court is charged with protecting. Hence, the scope of the variaall adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent, the court may, upon finding that
such variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries,
[if any,] vary the terms of a private trust. . . ." If similar legislation is proposed for
enactment in other states, this jurisdictional ambiguity should be avoided by inserting
these words.
35. See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
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tion power depends critically on what sorts of advantages constitute the requisite benefit. In particular, must the trust as varied implement the settlor's material purposes, on the theory that the settlor's views of what is good for the
trust beneficiaries are relevant or persuasive?
The term "benefit" is not defined in section 456.590.2. The Missouri legislation was patterned after the English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 37 which
provides that "the court shall not approve an arrangement on behalf of any
person unless the carrying out thereof would be for the benefit of that person." 38 Accordingly, decisions of the courts of England and of other British
Commonwealth countries which have adopted legislation similar to the Variation of Trusts Act 39 may provide guidance and a source of authority for Missouri courts in their struggle to define the necessary benefit.
Some cases indicate that a court should explicitly take into account disruption to the dispositive plan and purposes of the settlor as weighing against
approval of the proposed variation, but this factor seems to be relevant to the
court's exercise of discretion, not to its finding of the requisite benefit. Accordingly, examination of these cases will be deferred to the succeeding section of
the article.' 0 There appears to be a clear-cut answer to the relevance of the
settlor's purposes in determining whether beneficiaries will benefit. The theory
37. See supra note 32.
38. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1(1), supra note 32.
39. Legislation substantially identical to the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, has
been adopted in the Canadian provinces of Alberta, ALTA. REV. STAT. ch. 373, § 37
(1970), British Columbia, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 413 (1979), Manitoba, MAN. REV.
STAT. ch. T160, § 61 (1970), New Brunswick, N.B. REV. STAT. ch. T-15, § 26 (1973),
Nova Scotia, N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 323 (1967), Ontario, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 519 § 1
(1980), Prince Edward Island, P.E.I. REV. STAT. ch. V-1 (1974), and Saskatchewan,
SASK. REV.STAT. ch. V-1 (1978), and in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon as
well, N.W.T. Ord. ch. 29 § 2 (1963), YUK. REV. ORD. ch. T-5 (1971). Such legislation
is also in force in the Australian states of Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia.
Vic. STAT. § 63A (19-); QUEENSL. PUB.AcTs § 95 (19); W.AUSTL. REPR. AcTs §
90 (19-_); see generally, R. MEAGHER & W. GUMMOW, JACOBS' LAW OF TRUSTS IN
AUSTRALIA 1706 (4th ed. 1977).
New Zealand legislation contains an interesting variation on this point. Instead of
requiring a judicial finding that the proposed variation "benefit" incapacitated, minor,
unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, the statute provides:
the Court shall not approve an arrangement on behalf of any person if the
arrangement is to his detriment; and in determining whether any such arrangement is to the detriment of any person the Court may have regard to all
benefits which may accrue to him directly or indirectly in consequence of the
arrangement, including the welfare and honour of the family to which he
belongs....
N.Z. REPR. STAT. § 64A(1) (19-). See generally LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
421-39 (4th ed., N. Kelly ed. 1972).
The Trusts (Scotland) Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 57, § 1, makes similar trust
variation authority applicable to Scotland, but the jurisdiction is not conditioned on the
finding that protected beneficiaries will "benefit." Instead, the Scottish legislation demands only that the change "not be prejudicial" to the protected beneficiaries.
40. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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of the English legislation is judicial approval on behalf of beneficiaries who
are unable to give a legally binding consent.4" If they could make an effective
agreement, Saunders v. Vautier'2 would permit them to terminate or vary the
trust according to their perceived self-interest and without regard to the settlor's purposes. In acting for such legally incapacitated persons the court ought
similarly to base its decision exclusively on the court's evaluation of the best
interests of the beneficiaries, uninfluenced by the settlor's view of the matter.
One commentator, in discussing the Missouri statute and advocating its
adoption elsewhere, observed that its "underlying theory is that the court,
upon a determination that the variation will benefit the minor, disabled, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries, will make the decision that the beneficiaries would have made if they had been competent adults."' 3 The commentator goes on to note that several English decisions illustrate that the settlor's
intentions can be ignored under the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, and recommends that "a legislature adopting a variation of trusts statute should avoid
ambiguity by including language in the statute directing the courts to consider
the settlor's intentions before authorizing a variation.""" The Missouri statute
contains no such direction.' 5
b. Indirect or Non-Pecuniary Benefits
Problems in defining the requisite benefit do not disappear once it is concluded that the court should put aside the settlor's views and assume the perspective of a purely self-interested beneficiary. For the perfectly rational utility
maximizer, that mythical creature of the economist, may find that she derives
benefit not only from direct financial advantage, but also from much more
subjective and inconvenient sources, such as improved familial relations, enhanced social status, and the like. May-or must-a Missouri court take into
account indirect or nonpecuniary benefits in granting distributive variation,
and if so, how?
Decisions under the English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, and its Commonwealth progeny indicate that even the existence of financial benefit can
present problems. Must a court be certain that each member of the protected
class (i.e., the disabled, minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries) will
derive some financial advantage from the proposed variation, or is it sufficient
41. Re Druce's Settlement Trusts, [1962] 1 All E.R. 563, 567 ("The jurisdiction in effect enables the court to contract on behalf of certain beneficiaries, and I do
not see why it should not agree to that which in other circumstances they might have
agreed for themselves."); Albery, Modern Developments in Equity Law and Variation
of Trusts Act, 6 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 504, 510 (1971).
42. 4 Beav. 115, aff'd, Cr. & Ph. 240 (1841); see supra text accompanying

notes 10-15.
43. Comment, A Proposalfor a Variation of Trusts Statute in Washington, 8
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 625, 630 (1985).

44. Id. at 632.
45.

See supra text accompanying note 29.
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if the balance of probabilities favor the protected class? In some cases the
courts have required adult beneficiaries to purchase insurance or otherwise secure the protected beneficiaries against the risk that, due to an unlikely turn of
events, the financial benefits expected to flow from the variation do not materialize (i.e., the protected beneficiaries would have received more under the original terms of the trust).," Nevertheless, the authorities clearly establish that
certainty of financial benefit is not required-it is enough if the value received
by a protected beneficiary under the proposed variation exceeds
the actuarial
47
value of his interest in the trust as of the date of variation.
Any arrangement is capable of being regarded as beneficial under the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, if it can, on balancing probabilities, be regarded as a
good bargain, and the fact that in improbable circumstances, no benefit, or
even some loss is possible, does not necessarily deprive the arrangement of
48

that quality.

This observation was made in a case in which the Chancery Division approved
the replacement of contingent principal beneficiaries' interests with interests in
a discretionary trust.' 9 Accordingly, the court may find financial benefit even

where the advantage derived from the variation depends on the exercise of
human judgment; the appraisal need not be limited to typical actuarial risks.
Recent cases go further than a probabilistic evaluation of the direct financial results of the variation. Indirect benefits, such as a child receives when his
parents have the financial wherewithal to provide a better home, 50 as well as
46. E.g., Re Druce's Settlement Trusts, [1962] 1 All E.R. 563, 565 (insurance
against loss of expected succession tax savings due to early death of current income
beneficiary); Re Clitheroe's Settlement Trusts, [1959] 3 All E.R. 789 (covenant and
security to protect possible future wife, an unascertained contingent beneficiary,
against loss of discretionary income interest); Re Bristol's Settled Estates, [1964] 3 All
E.R. 939, 943 (both insurance against loss of tax savings and covenant on behalf of
possible future wife); Dutchess of Westminster v. Royal Trust Co., 32 D.L.R.3d 631
(N.S. Sup. Ct. 1972) (insurance payable in the event of birth, to aged parents, of
unborn principal beneficiaries); Re Aitken's Trust, [1964] N.Z.L.R. 838, 843-44 (covenant and security to protect contingent principal beneficiaries on early termination and
distribution of trust corpus); Re Bryant, [1964] N.Z.L.R. 846, 849 (same); Re
Beetham's Trust, [1964] N.Z.L.R. 576, 578 (same); see also Re Robertson's Will
Trusts, [1960] 3 All E.R. 146, 148 (adult contingent beneficiaries insist on insurance).
47. Re Cohen's Will Trusts, [1959] 3 All E.R. 523, 524 ("If the court is asked
to sanction this sort of scheme, those who seek the court's sanction must be prepared to
take some sort of risk, and if it is a risk that an adult would take, the court is prepared
to take it on behalf of an infant."); Re Van Gruisen's Will Trusts, [1964] 1 All E.R.
843, 844 (variation approved where it was shown that interests of infants and unborn
persons in the new trust were actuarially more beneficial than their contingent interest
in principal of the old trust); Re Irving, 11 Ont. 2d 443, 451-52, 455-58 (1975).
48. Re Druce's Settlement Trusts, [1962] 1 All E.R. 563, 565.
49. Id. at 567.
50. Re Irving, 11 Ont. 2d 443, 454-55 (1975); Re Kovish, 18 E.T.R. 133 (B.C.
Sup. Ct. 1985); Re Ridalls, 24 Sask. R. 16, 14 E.T.R. 157 (Sask. Q.B. 1983) (noting
both that the increased value of the estate resulting from tax savings could ultimately
be expected to pass to the grandchildren from their parents and that the grandchildren
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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social and psychological benefits, such as reduced likelihood of family discord,
have been found to be advantages that may be taken into account in approving
trust variation. 5' In a few cases such non-pecuniary benefits alone have been
held sufficient to justify a trust variation involving the release of very considerable financial benefits, or have been relied upon in rejecting proposals that
would substantially increase monetary benefits. 52 These decisions have been
criticized,5 3 apparently out of concern that the evaluation of nonmaterial benefits is overly subjective and disruptive of the settlor's plan. Yet an expansive
54
interpretation of the requisite benefit is now firmly established.
would also be better off in the interim as a result of the increased distribution to their
parents); Re Bryant, [1964] N.Z.L.R. 846.
51. Re Zekelman, 19 D.L.R. 3d 652, 654 (Ont. High Ct. 1971) (equalizing
interests of settlor's children to eliminate "a very fruitful source of dissention among
the members of the family"). Contra Farrington v. Rogers, 19 B.C.L.R. 373, 375-76
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 1980).
52. Re Remnant's Settlement Trusts, [1970] 2 All E.R. 554, 559 (elimination
of religious forfeiture provision which would have increased the share of corpus to be
received by settlor's Protestant grandchildren at the expense of their Catholic cousins);
Re C.L., [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1275 (release of trust interests of mentally incompetent
adult with other sources of support approved despite lack of consideration where
adopted childern would benefit from large tax savings, because if she were capable of
managing her own affairs it is highly probable she would consent to the arrangement);
Re Zekelman, 19 D.L.R. 3d 652 (Ont. High Ct. 1971); Re Weston's Settlements,
[1968] 3 All E.R. 338, 342 (per Lord Denning, M.R.) (refusal to approve variation
that would permit trust beneficiaries to avoid incidence of heavy capital gains tax,
where avoidance required relocation to Jersey, the court noting that "many things in
life are more worth-while than money" and that the social and educational disadvantages of the removal from England "would imperil the true welfare of the children").
To the contrary is Re Tinker's Settlement, [1960] 3 All E.R. 85, in which the
court observed:
I cannot bring myself to think that I would be benefitting the daughter's children if I gave away half of that which will come to the daughter's share, if
the son dies under thirty.
Counsel for the applicant has argued that this is a sensible and fair thing
to do because somebody has blundered-somebody has forgotten about the
son's children-and it would seem very hard that this half of this substantial
settlement should go away from his children to his sister and her children. In
a broad sense, so the argument runs, it would be beneficial to the sister's
children as members of the family viewed as a whole that something which
was reasonable and fair should be done. I cannot apply the jurisdiction under
the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, in that broad way. Although it may very
well be that one can throw that kind of consideration into the scales beside a
financial benefit which has already been established, yet one cannot regard
that sort of consideration as a benefit in itself.
Id. at 87.
53. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 119, 125-26 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
54. In addition to the authorities cited in notes 50-52, supra, a liberal interpretation of the term "benefit" is supported by Re Steed's Will Trusts, [1960] 1 All E.R.
487, 493, and the New Zealand statute expressly authorizes the court to take into
account indirect and nonpecuniary benefits, see supra note 39. However, it appears that
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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This expansive interpretation of benefit seems clearly correct, and should
be followed by Missouri courts. After all, many things in life are more important than money. In deciding whether to grant or withhold consent to a proposed variation, adult beneficiaries will take into account their own personal
valuation of any indirect and nonmaterial benefits. The court, acting for disabled, minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries, should do the same.
The subjectivity concern-that material and nonmaterial benefits are by nature incomparable, so that the court will be forced to make arbitrary decisions-is groundless. In many other areas (e.g., child custody, 55 adoption,5 6
guardianship, and conservatorship proceedings57 ) the courts are required to determine what action is in the "best interests" of a minor or disabled person,
which demands just such a comparison. Of course, the court cannot know how
each protected beneficiary would subjectively value the universe of material
and nonmaterial benefits and detriments presented by any proposed variation.
To perform the judicial function the court does not need to know-minors and
disabled persons cannot give legally-binding consent precisely because we do
not trust their subjective preferences. The duty of the court is to decide as a
disinterested reasonable person, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the social, economic, and family status of the
protected beneficiaries, whether the advantages of the proposed scheme outweigh its disadvantages. The comparison of material and nonmaterial benefits
is ultimately a matter of judgment, but that judgment is neither arbitrary nor
unreviewable.
The concern that taking account of indirect and non-pecuniary benefits
may prove disruptive of the settlor's dispositive plan is valid. Such disruption,
however, does not negate the existence of a net benefit. Instead, it goes to the
issue whether the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to so
disrupt the plan.
the courts of British Columbia hold that social or psychological advantages cannot
override actual financial loss. Farrington v. Rogers, 19 B.C.L.R. 373 (B.C. Sup. Ct.
1980). But see Re Tweedie, [1976] 3 W.W.R. 1, 64 D.L.R.3d 569 (B.C. Sup. Ct.)

(where the chance that protected contingent beneficiaries will receive any distribution
under the original terms of the trust is minute, the psychological, emotional, and family
benefit of lifting a financial burden from a family member is sufficient to justify the
variation). Compare Kunater v. Royal Trust Corp., 23 B.C.L.R. 287, 291 (B.C. Sup.
Ct. 1980) (elimination of contingent principal beneficiaries' interests in order to provide

their parents with greater flexibility in dealing with the fund is not a benefit) with Re
Kovish, 18 E.T.R. 133 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1985) (early termination of trust with distribution of corpus to settlor's grandchildren to permit them to invest in a family business
approved on behalf of unborn great-grandchildren, contingent principal beneficiaries,
who would indirectly benefit if the business prospers).
55. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375.2 (Supp. 1984) (requiring court to consider
"all relevant factors").
56. E.g., id. § 453.030.1.
57.

E.g., id. § 475.082.5.
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On the Exercise of Discretion

Assuming that all adult trust beneficiaries who are not disabled consent
and that the court finds any protected beneficiaries will derive a net benefit
from the change, still the court is not required to order the variation or termination. Exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the Missouri statute, like the
Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, is discretionary, not mandatory." In exercising
this equitable discretion Missouri courts, like their English and Commonwealth brethren, are likely to consider chiefly two issues. First, is the benefit to
protected beneficiaries large enough to justify the variation-that is, is the
change a "good bargain?" Second, should approval be denied on the ground
that the change would be overly disruptive of the settlor's purposes?5
a.

Exacting a Good Bargain

The smallest net benefit-any overall advantage, however minute--could
justify a judicial finding that a protected beneficiary will "benefit," thereby
fulfilling the statutory prerequisite to trust variation. Because the court is
called upon to act in the interests of persons who are not in a position to
protect themselves, more than minimal advantage should be demanded on be58. E.g., Re Van Gruisen's Will Trusts, [1964] 1 All E.R. 843:
The proviso to s. 1 of the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, provides that in such
a case as this the court shall not approve the arrangement on behalf of the
infant and unborn persons, unless it is for their benefit. The proviso does not
say that the court must approve it if it is for their benefit. It is negative, not
positive. In addition the court has a discretion under the provision in s. 1 (1)
that it "may if it thinks fit by order approve" the arrangement. Therefore the
court has an overall discretion to approve or not to approve the arrangement
on behalf of the infants and unborn persons, provided it is for their benefit.
Id. at 844.
The Missouri statute provides that "the court may. . . vary the terms of a private
trust," Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Supp. 1984), while the English legislation provides that "the court may if it thinks fit approve" the variation, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53,
supra, note 32.
59. See, e.g., Re Irving, 11 Ont. 2d 443 (1975):
The court is concerned whether the arrangement as a whole, in all the
circumstances, is such that it is proper to approve it. By way of a brief prefatory summation then, and further to the powers conferred under s. 1 of the
Variation of Trusts Act, approval is to be measured, inter alia, by reference
to these considerations: First, does it keep alive the basic intention of the testator? Second, is there a benefit to be obtained on behalf of infants and of all
persons who are or may become interested under the trusts of the will? And,
third, is the benefit to be obtained on behalf of those for whom the Court is
acting such that a prudent adult motivated by intelligent self-interest and sustained consideration of the expectancies and risks and the proposal made,
would be likely to accept?
Id. at 450. Accord Kunater v. Royal Trust Corp., 23 B.C.L.R. 287, 289 (B.C. Sup. Ct.
1980); Re Ridalls, 24 Sask. R. 16, 14 E.T.R. 157 (Sask. Q.B. 1983); Re Dent, 18
E.T.R. 252 (Sask. Surr. Ct. 1984).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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half of the protected beneficiaries. Instead, the court should exact the best
possible bargain.
It is shown that actuarially the provisions for the infants and unborn
persons are more beneficial for them under the arrangement than under the
present trusts of the will. That, however, does not conclude the case. The
court is not merely concerned with this actuarial calculation, even assuming
that it satisfies the statutory requirement that the arrangement must be for
the benefit of the infants and unborn persons. The court is also concerned
whether the arrangement as a whole, in all the circumstances, is such that it
is proper to approve it. The court's concern involves, inter alia, a practical and
business-like consideration of the arrangement, including the total amounts of
the advantages which the various parties obtain and their bargaining strength.
In this case, the life tenant and her sons obtain very substantial amounts
under the arrangement, whilst the actuarial value of the interests of the infants and unborn persons under the trusts of the will is comparatively very
small. In these circumstances, the infants and unborn persons are clearly in a
strong bargaining position to obtain shares that exceed the actuarial value of
their interests under the will, and it is proper that this should be reflected in
the shares allotted to them under the arrangement. My only hesitation in this
case has been whether their shares adequately exceed such actuarial value,
but on the whole I come to the conclusion that they do. If the infants and
unborn persons had the capacities of a reasonable person, sui juris, would they
enter into this arrangement now, and as it at present stands? I consider that
they would. I approve the arrangement as asked. 60
Put differently, the court should exercise the same degree of care and prudence that a reasonable person would exercise in deciding whether to agree to
the proposed change. The authorities abroad are all in agreement with this
approach, 61 and Missouri courts should demand as much for disabled, minor,
unborn, and unascertained trust beneficiaries.
b.

Disrupting the Settlor's Plan

Cases under the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, and its Commonwealth
counterparts make it clear that a second factor to be given consideration in the
exercise of judicial discretion is the extent to which the proposed variation
would frustrate accomplishment of the settlor's purposes in establishing the
trust. 62 The relevance of this factor in jurisdictions which follow Saunders v.
60. Van Gruisen's Will Trusts, [1964] 1 All E.R. 843, 844.
61. Re Irving, 11 Ont. 2d 443, 449, 450 (1975); see Re Cohen's Will Trusts,
[1959] 3 All E.R. 523, 524 ("if it is a risk that an adult would be prepared to take, the
court is prepared to take it on behalf of an infant"); Re Druce's Settlement Trusts,
[1962] 1 All E.R. 563, 565 ("[a]ny arrangement is capable of being regarded as beneficial under the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, if it can, on balancing probabilities, be
regarded as a good bargain").
62. E.g., Re Steed's Will Trusts, [1960] 1 All E.R. 487, 493 ("the court is
bound to look at the scheme as a whole, and when it does so, to consider, as surely it
must, what really was the intention of the benefactor"); Re Burney's Settlement
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6

18

Wiedenbeck: Weidenbeck: Missorui's Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine

1985]

CLAFLIN DOCTRINE

Vautier 3 is open to serious question, and the opinions offer no explanation. In
such jurisdictions competent adult beneficiaries are permitted to modify or terminate the trust by agreement among themselves and without regard to the
settlor's purposes. Inasmuch as the court is called upon to approve the scheme
on behalf of beneficiaries who cannot give a legally-binding consent-that is,
to make an agreement which they would be likely to make for themselves if
capable-there is no apparent reason why the settlores purposes should be
taken into account.
Although decisions abroad indicate that consistency with the settlor's plan
is one factor to be considered, it is not of overriding importance. Some cases
suggest that the matter is one of sanctioning a change that will substantially
promote accomplishment of the settlor's primary or predominant purpose at
the expense of less central (secondary or ancillary)- purposes." Other cases
abjure this fictional attempt to divine the settlor's answer to a question never
put. In lieu of judicial prioritization of trust goals cloaked in the fiction of the
settlor's intent, these cases frankly admit that the approved variation may undermine an important purpose of the trust.6 5 And in the most famous and farreaching decision the Chancery Division struck out a religious forfeiture clause
which was intended by the settlor to deprive grandchildren practicing Roman
Catholicism of their interests, giving them instead to his Protestant grandchildren. The court observed that "the arrangement defeats this testator's intention. That is a serious but by not means conclusive consideration." 6 6 Accordingly, a court's evaluation may reveal that the interests of protected
beneficiaries outweigh the settlor's interest in dead hand control.
Missouri courts, operating under a regime in which the settlor's purposes
are paramount (as the Claflin doctrine demonstrates), would naturally be inclined in exercising their discretion to treat disruption of the settlor's plan as
weighing Job SY:(DARBY3)808.JOB aborted by PAGER!against authorization of trust variation. Indeed, resort to a primary purpose/secondary purpose
distinction is almost predictable. Yet too-ready acceptance of the relevance of
the settlor's purposes would be unfortunate, for the new trust variation statute
Trusts, [1961] 1 All E.R. 856, 858; Re Towler's Settlement Trusts, [1963] 3 All E.R.
759, 761-62; Re Irving, 11 Ont. 2d 443, 448-50 (1975); Re Smith, [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R.

495, 500 (suggesting changes that "would preserve much more of the scheme of the
will").
63. 4 Beav. 115, affid, Cr. & Ph. 240 (1841).
64. E.g., Re Bodle's Trust, [1970] N.Z.L.R. 750, 752; Re Irving, 11 Ont. 2d
443, 448 (1976).
65. E.g., Faye v. Faye, [1973] W. Austl. R. 66, 73 (protective trust, designed to
restrain alienation of income beneficiaries' interests, modified to permit alienation upon
consent of two-thirds majority of trustees, even though proposal "designed to interfere
with the intention of the settlor"); see LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, SIXTH REPORT, CMD.

310, Court's Power to Sanction Variation of Trusts, paras. 21 & 27(3) (1957) (beneficiaries' interests are of paramount importance; although settlor should be heard on an
application for variation the court could overrule his objections).
66. Re Remnant's Settlement Trusts, [1970] 2 All E.R. 554, 559.
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may signify a reordering of social priorities. Automatic adoption of traditional
analytic approaches would obscure the fact that the new legislation creates a
framework for the resolution of competing intergenerational claims to the control of resources. The relevance, vel non, of the settlor's purposes to a grant of
trust variation is the central issue in that competition. Facile application of a
"material purpose" analysis would therefore amount to a covert resolution of
that competition in favor of continuing dead hand control, as the next section
of the article will demonstrate.
C.

Trust Purposes, JudicialDiscretion and the Policy Against
Perpetuities

Even if Missouri courts feel compelled to deny a proposed trust variation
that would significantly undermine the settlor's plan, the new legislation is still
an important innovation, for it is the first recognition in Missouri of general cy
pres jurisdiction over private trusts. 67 If instead the courts adopt the expansive
view of their authority advocated here, then they would be free to vary the
trust in accordance with their own best judgment of the needs and capacities
of the beneficiaries, which is tantamount to judicial resettlement of private
trusts.
Although these two approaches are quite different, they correspond to alternative plausible policy justifications for the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.08 In choosing between these approaches, therefore, Missouri courts
67. By legislation adopted in 1965, Missouri has authorized a cy pres reform of
either legal or equitable interests that violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.555.2 (1978). See infra text accompanying note 72; see
also Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970) (judicial
adoption of cy pres perpetuities reform); 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS §§ 1256, 1411 (2d ed. Supp. 1985); Browder, Construction, Reformation,
and the Rule Against Perpetuities.62 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1963).
68. The productivity rationale (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 8084) and the judicial economy rationale (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 9094) are not the only justifications that have been advanced for the Rule Against Perpetuities. Originally, the Rule served to promote the practical alienability of land, thereby
tending to assure that the most important economic resource in an agrarian economy
was devoted to its highest and best use. Professor Lewis Simes has ably demonstrated
that this traditional justification, which views the Rule Against Perpetuities as the
property-law analog to the anti-trust laws, has little force today because the future
interests to which the Rule is applied in modern society are nearly always equitable
interests in a trust. Under the trust instrument or by operation of law the trustee quite
generally has the power of alienation, and in addition, the corpus of most trusts is
invested in stocks and bonds with corporate management possessed of full power to
make the assets productive. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 40-54

(1955).
Recognizing these changes in the form of wealth and property dispositions since
the seventeenth century, some commentators have suggested that the modern purpose
of the Rule is to curb trusts. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 24, at 769-70;
F. LAWSON & B. RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 185-86 (2d ed. 1982). The problem
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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will be committing themselves, consciously or unconsciously, to a unique conception of the policy against perpetuities. Thus, the interpretation of Missouri's new trust variation statute necessarily entails some fundamental philosophical choices about the institution of private property. This portion of the
article will attempt to illuminate the philosophical dichotomy which now underlies the Rule Against Perpetuities, so that these choices can be made with
full awareness of their implications.
1. Preserving the Settlor's Plan
a.

Cy Pres Revision

The suit for trust variation will be initiated by a beneficiary or trustee 9
who seeks some advantage that cannot be obtained under the terms of the
trust as written. If the court is to effectuate the settler's purposes in exercising
its discretion to grant or withhold approval of the proposed variation, then a
judgment must be made as to whether, under the settlor's plan, the advantages
sought are sufficient to justify the impairment of other objectives that may be
caused by the change. The advantage sought is invariably one not contemplated by the settlor, 70 and trusts commonly promote a variety of objectives, so
the court will be forced to make judgments about the settlor's likely priority of
objectives. Occasionally these judgments will have a fair basis in inferences
drawn from the trust instrument and the circumstances surrounding its execution. But more often than not the court will be forced to guess at priorities.
That guess often amounts to supplying the court's own ordering of objectives
with trusts is the conservative investment policy of trustees-the supply of risk capital,
which is essential for innovation and economic growth, may dry up if too much of
society's wealth is held in trust. F. LAWSON & B. RUDDEN supra; Downing, The Duration and Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 16 W. RESERVE L. REV. 350, 365-69
(1965). This is an important concern, but amendment of the prudent investor standard
to permit true diversification of trust portfolios, including investments in ventures
which, considered in isolation, are highly speculative, would mitigate the problem. And
the problem might be eliminated entirely if the settlor or the trust beneficiaries were
permitted to specify the risk/return trade-off to be followed by the trustee in making
investment decisions. See Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 603, 616-21 (1970).
For an historical and philosophical review of the doctrinal conflict between the
invalidity of restraints on alienation of legal interests in property and the American
courts' recognition of spendthrift and Claflin trusts, see Alexander, The Dead Hand
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
69. Any trustee or beneficiary may make application for trust variation under
Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.4 (Supp. 1984). The law is similar in England, although
applications by trustees are apparently disfavored. Re Druce's Settlement Trusts,
[1962] 1 All E.R. 563, 568.
70. If the advantage sought was specifically contemplated and rejected by the
settlor, the application for trust variation has no hope of success in a regime in which
disruption of the settlor's plan weighs against approval. Haskell, supra note 4, at 28384, 292.
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based on the rationalization that the settlor would have acted as reasonable
person.
This is the same analytic approach used under the cy pres doctrine in
determining whether, when a particular charitable objective becomes impossible or impractical to accomplish, it would be more consistent with the testator's purposes to substitute a similar charitable goal or mandate reversion of
the property.
It is seldom that the testator's intention can be definitely analyzed and
divided into a particular and a general intention. It is ordinarily impossible to
determine what disposition the testator intended should be made of the property if his particular purpose could not be carried out. Indeed, it is ordinarily
true that the testator does not contemplate the failure of his particular purpose, and all that a court can do is to make a guess not as to what he intended
but as to what he would have intended if he had thought about the matter.7 1
Accordingly, section 456.590.2 can be viewed as an extension to private trusts
of the traditional judicial power to alter cy pres the distributive provisions of a
charitable trust. It should be noted that this interpretation would be consistent
with Missouri's perpetuities reform legislation. The distributive variation statute would authorize reformation of equitable interests that do not violate the
Rule Against Perpetuities but which fail to effectuate the settlor's purposes for
other reasons, just as Missouri's cy pres approach to perpetuities reform authorizes reformation, within the constraints imposed by the Rule, of legal or
2
equitable interests that violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.7
Although the analytic approach is the same, the precise scope of private
trust variation and charitable cy pres need not be identical. Charitable purposes are altered only when the settlor's particular goal becomes "impossible
or impractical" of accomplishment.7 The contours of "impractical" are illdefined, but showing that a change would increase the utility of the gift to
charitable beneficiaries is apparently not sufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate that the settlor's specific purpose is impractical. 4 Where the application
for private trust termination is made to secure some overall financial advantage, such as savings in transfer taxes (the goal of most of the English and
Commonwealth cases), the conclusion may be that the settlor would have preferred to make a larger gift to his beneficiaries rather than insisting on a par71.

4 A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 399.2, at 3094.

72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.555.2 (1978).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 399 and comment q (1959); 4 A.
SCOTT, supra note 6, § 399.4.
74. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 439, at 560, states the issue this way:
The line between impossibility, impracticability, and inexpediency on the
one side, and inconvenience or slight undesirability on the other, may be difficult to draw, but it may constitute the boundary between the use of cy pres
and the refusal to apply that doctrine. The court will not substitute a new
scheme merely because the trustee or the court believes it would be a better
plan than that which the settlor provided.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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ticular order and timing of payout.7 5 In these circumstances it might not appear "impractical" to carry the original terms of trust into effect, merely less
advantageous. Thus, it might seem that the private trust variation power has a
broader application than the doctrine of cy pres. Yet this difference may be
more semantic than real, for Professor Scott believed that there is:
a tendency in the more recent cases to permit a cy pres application even
though it is difficult to say that it is impracticable to carry out the specific
purpose, but where it would be so unwise to do so that the testator would
presumably not have desired to insist upon it.78
While new to Missouri, statutes in a minority of states authorize a limited
private trust cy pres power. For example, Pennsylvania legislation provides:
Failure of original purpose.-The court having jurisdiction of a trust
heretofore or hereafter created, regardless of any spendthrift or similar provision therein, in its discretion may terminate such trust in whole or in part, or
make an allowance from principal to one or more beneficiaries provided the
court after hearing is satisfied that the original purpose of the conveyor cannot be carried out or is impractical of fulfillment and that the termination,
partial termination, or allowance more nearly approximates the intention of
the conveyor, and notice is given to all parties in interest or to their duly
7
appointed fiduciaries.
This power has been used most frequently to terminate so-called "nuisance
trusts" where the corpus is so small that the benefits of the trust do not justify
the costs of administration, or to make an allowance from corpus for a needy
income beneficiary who was the primary object of the settlor's bounty where
there are minor or unborn contingent principal beneficiaries who cannot consent.7 8 Similar legislation is in effect in New York, California, Kentucky, and
75. Of course, termination would be denied despite the savings if the court were
to find that it was a material purpose of the settlor to keep the trust fund out of the
beneficiaries' hands, because discretion would be exercised to avoid undue disruption of
the settlor's plan. Accomplishment of the settlor's particular purpose (protecting the
beneficiaries) obviously would not be impracticable in this circumstance.
76. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 399.4, at 3124 (footnote omitted). E.g., Matter
of Crichfield Trust, 177 N.J. Super. 258, 426 A.2d 88 (1980) (trust providing $400
annual college scholarship to male graduates of certain high school varied cy pres to
permit increase in stipend and extension to women graduates).
77. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (Purdon Supp. 1985). Originally enacted in 1947, the official comment to this section states:
Termination of trusts, which have failed in their purpose and which have become oppressive or otherwise undesirable, has been impossible in numerous
instances due to inability to secure the consent of persons unborn, unascertained, or not sui juris. The purpose of this section is to give relief in such
cases. . . . The relief to be given is in the nature of cy pres, thus preventing a
complete frustration of the conveyor's intention.
Id. official comment-1947.
78. See Wright, Termination of Trusts in Pennsylvania-Some Current
Trends, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 926 (1967).
A few courts have permitted, without statutory authorization, an allowance to be
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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b.

Intergenerational Compromise for Productivity

Discretionary application of a cy pres approach to trust variation would
be consistent with one widely accepted policy justification for the Rule Against
Perpetuities-that the Rule is a simple compromise between conflicting intergenerational claims to the control of resources. Professor Lewis Simes explained this rationale as follows:
[T]he Rule against Perpetuities strikes a fair balance between the desires of
members of the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property which they enjoy. . . . [O]ne of
the most common human wants is the desire to distribute one's property at
death without restriction in whatever manner he desires. Indeed, we can go
farther, and say that there is a policy in favor of permitting people to create
future interests by will, as well as present interests, because that also accords
with human desires. The difficulty here is that, if we give free rein to the
desires of one generation to create future interests, the members of succeeding
generations will receive the property in a restricted state. They will thus be
unable to create all the future interests they wish. Perhaps, they may not even
be able to devise it at all. Hence, to come most nearly to satisfying the desires
of peoples of all generations, we must strike a fair balance between unrestricted testamentary disposition of property by the present generation and
unrestricted disposition by future generations.8"
It may at first seem an odd sort of intergenerational "compromise" that gives
the testator or settlor, typically a member of the older generation, complete
authority to restrict and control devolution of the property throughout the entire lifetime of his younger-generation beneficiaries and for up to twenty-one
made from principal for a needy income beneficiary where there are unborn or unascertained beneficiaries who cannot consent. In the leading case, In re Wolcott, 95 N.H.
23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948), the court authorized an allowance from corpus to the testator's needy wife, the income beneficiary, where the testator's sons, the likely principal
beneficiaries, consented, despite the fact that the gift of trust corpus was to testator's
issue per stirpes. The court found a primary purpose "not expressed in words, but nevertheless ... implicit in the disposition made of his estate," 95 N.H. 26, 56 A.2d 644,
to furnish reasonable support to the testator's wife. This finding was held to justify a
limited invasion of corpus, either because the trust should be construed to contain an
implied invasion power (a theory approved by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS §
168 comment d & illustration 5 (1959)), or because literal adherence to the trust terms
would prevent accomplishment of the settlor's purpose due to unanticipated changes in
circumstances (a theory generally used only to justify administrativedeviation, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167(1) & illustrations 1-24 (1959)). Accord McAfee v. Thomas, 121 Ore. 351, 255 P. 333 (1927) (implicit invasion powers).
79. N.Y. ESTATE POWERS & TRUST LAW § 7-1.6(b) (McKinney 1967); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2279.1 (West 1985); KY. REV. STAT. § 386.185 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 701.13(3) (West 1981).
80. L. SIMES, supra note 68, at 58-59; see also 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra
note 67, § 1117, at 13; Downing, supra note 68, at 359-60.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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years thereafter. The Rule may reconcile competing claims of the transferor
and remote generations, but it does so at the expense of the immediate beneficiaries, disregarding entirely their claims for autonomy and control.
The explanation for such a one-sided "compromise" is that the law prefers the wishes of transferors-the older generation-because it is in the best
interests of society to maintain incentives to produce, invest, and accumulate
income. The unarticulated assumption is that the most productive members of
society-entrepreneurs and highly-trained professionals, for example-would
be less inclined to work, save, and invest if they are not given control over the
disposition of the property they accumulate. 81 The cy pres approach to trust
variation, by preserving the settlor's plan to the fullest extent possible in unanticipated circumstances, assures the owners of property that their wishes will
be implemented, and therefore functions to maintain economic incentives. 82
There are two large holes in this productivity-based rationale for the Rule
Against Perpetuities and the primacy of the settlor/testator's intentions. First,
not all property owners are economically productive, and many beneficiaries
could be more productive if they had unrestricted use of the property they
receive by donative transfer. Property owners are permitted to control devolution even though they are merely passing on dynastic wealth accumulated by
others. And the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust might be a superb venture
capitalist, with a talent for fostering the development of important, innovative
new technologies, if only she could get her hands on enough capital to invest.
The Rule Against Perpetuities, if founded on a concern for economic incentives, obviously reflects a judgment that these cases are relatively unimportant,
and that on balance respecting the donor's wishes will do more to foster productivity than could be achieved by giving the donee/beneficiary a free hand.8 3
The second critique of the productivity rationale may be far more devastating. It must be remembered that the Rule Against Perpetuities is distinct
from the principle of free testation. Society could follow the principle of free
testation but abolish almost all future interests in property.8" If so, the testator
81. Thus the "compromise" view of the policy against perpetuities is primarily
concerned with the maintenance of economic incentives. Owners of property are not
granted perpetual control over the disposition of their estate because the utility associ-

ated with an ability to control property devolution centuries hence (i.e., the additional

incentive value of perpetuities) is so highly discounted for deferral that it can be safely
eliminated, if doing so is necessary in serving other societal objectives.
82. R. POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.5 (2d ed. 1977). Indeed, it is
often suggested that the charitable trust cy pres power actually increases the incentive
to make charitable dispositions (and concomitantly the incentive to produce and accumulate for that purpose) because the settlor is assured that her purposes will be carried
out, rather than frustrated by wooden adherence to the specific terms of the trust long
after circumstances have so far changed that those terms have become nonfunctional.
See id. § 18.3; 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 399.
83. While this intuitive evaluation of countervailing economic incentives seems
quite sensible, empirical research is needed to prove this hypothesis.
84. An exception would of course be necessary for the reversion following a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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would be free to select the objects of his bounty and determine the amount of
their gifts, but all donative transfers would have to confer immediate absolute
ownership. The economic incentive maintained by the Rule Against Perpetuities, therefore, is only the incentive that inheres in an ability to restrict and
control the beneficiary's use of the property. Obviously, abolishing free testation (or high rates of transfer taxation) would deter a person from accumulating an estate greater than that which is necessary to maintain a desired standard of living for the duration of his or her life, but the incremental incentive
effect conferred by the ability to control beneficiaries' use of property for a
period of lives in being and twenty-one years seems far less substantial.
2.

The Broad View of Judicial Authority
a. Judicial Resettlement

Missouri's trust variation statute is susceptible to an interpretation that
would permit the courts to terminate or vary a trust in a manner that would
undermine the settlor's purposes,8 5 and the new jurisdiction could even be exercised where all beneficiaries are in being and sui juris, provided they consent.8 6 This broad approach to judicial authority would not permit arbitrary
variation or require the courts to rubber-stamp proposals agreed-upon by all
competent adult beneficiaries. The standard for the exercise of judicial discretion under a private trust cy pres power is maximum effectuation of the settlor's purposes in light of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., overlooked tax saving
opportunities or unanticipated future events). Instead, the standard for the exercise of judicial discretion under the broad approach would be a judicial finding that the change is in the best interests of the beneficiaries, even though it
may hinder or prevent the accomplishment of some of the settlor's purposes .8
This is not to say that the settlor's purposes, as revealed by the trust instrument or inferred from surrounding circumstances, have no bearing on the
issue, but rather that they are not binding on the court, merely advisory. Thus,
independent judicial evaluation of the needs and capabilities of the beneficiaries-including consenting adult beneficiaries-is called for under the
term of years, in order to preserve the commercial leasehold.
85. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. But see infra note 87.
86. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
87. Adoption of the broad view of judicial authority does not require a corresponding change in the rule that the settlor's consent is necessary to terminate a trust if
the settlor is still on the scene. See supra note 6. During life the settlor can attempt to
control his donees' behavior through non-trust devices (e.g., conditional gifts or periodic
gifts combined with threats or promises). Perhaps the same control should be exercisable under a trust during continuance of the settlor's life. Note, however, that §
536.590.2 does not limit the courts' variation power to situations where the settlor cannot consent. Accordingly, perhaps the courts, in the exercise of judicial discretion,
should refuse to vary a trust where the settlor is still on the scene but does not consent.
That is, in this limited and unusual situation disruption of the settlor's plan should
weigh heavily against approval of the proposed change.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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broad approach. 88 This interpretation would, in effect, authorize judicial resettlement of trusts,8 9 and to provide a sound basis for informed judgment would
require factfinding concerning the beneficiaries' needs and abilities.
b.

Dead Hand Control for Judicial Economy

The broad view of judicial authority under the Missouri distributive variation statute is consistent with an alternative policy rationale for the Rule
Against Perpetuities-that the Rule limits dead hand control of property because it is "socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its
living members and not by the dead." 90 Permitting trust variation to be guided
88. The Chancery Division, in Re Towler's Settlement Trusts, [1964] Ch. 158,
[1963] 3 All. E.R. 759, appears to have conducted just such an independent judicial
appraisal of a beneficiary's needs and capabilities. The court approved an arrangement
on behalf of a minor who was scheduled to receive a large distribution of corpus at age
twenty-one, but who had proved to be "alarmingly immature and irresponsible as regards money," under which the distribution would be delayed until the beneficiary was
older, and in the meantime her interest in the trust would be protected from creditors.
See also Re Burney's Settlement Trusts, [1961] 1 All E.R. 856, 858, in which the
court concluded that the interests of contingent beneficiaries of a protected life interest
in a trust (that is, the persons who might take income upon forfeiture for alienation of
the life income beneficiary's interest) could be eliminated where the financial circumstances of the protected life income beneficiary had so far improved since settlement of
the fund in trust that the original purpose of protecting that beneficiary from creditors
had become unnecessary and obsolete.
89. See Re Seale's Marriage Settlement, Ch. 574, [1961] 3 All E.R. 136
(transfer of English trust to Canada and conforming amendments to comply with Quebec law accomplished by making judicial approval of the revokation conditional on the
resettlement); see also Re Ball's Settlement, [1968] 2 All E.R. 438, 442 ("if an arrangement, while leaving the substratum, effectuates the purpose of the original trust
by other means, it may still be possible to regard that arrangement as merely varying
the original trusts, even though the means employed are wholly different and even
though the form is completely changed"). But see Re Towler's Settlement Trusts,
[1964] Ch. 158, [1963] 3 All E.R. 759, in which the court extended a trust beyond its
scheduled termination date but refused to authorize the transfer of the fund into a new
trust as of that date,
Though presented as a variation, it is in truth a complete new resettlement.
The former trust funds were to be got in from the former trustees and held in
totally new trusts such as might be made by an absolute owner of the funds. I
do not think that the court can approve this [under the jurisdiction conferred
by the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958]. Alternatively, if it can, I think it
should not do so. ...
Id. at
, [1963] 3 All E.R. at 762; accord Re Purves, 14 D.L.R.4th 738 (B.C. Sup.
Ct. 1984). It is submitted that such a distinction between a "variation" (the extension
of an existing trust) and a "complete new resettlement" is without substance and
merely preserves the fiction that a court cannot write a will or trust for the testator or
settlor.
90. L. SIMEs, supra note 68, at 59. Professor Simes expands upon this view by
observing:
I know of no better statement of that doctrine than the language of Thomas
Jefferson, contained in a letter to James Madison, when he said: "The earth
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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only by an objective judicial evaluation of contemporary circumstances shifts
the balance, transferring greater control over the use of trust property from
the settlor to the living generation, but not to the beneficiaries acting alone.
This dead-hand versus living-hand justification of the policy against perpetuities is obviously incomplete, for the Rule sanctions dead-hand control for
one full generation and the minority of the next, in derogation of the asserted
preference for resource control by the living. The explanation for this apparent
anomaly lies not in a concern for productivity, but in a concern that the gift
maximize the benefit to the donee. Yet, because many donees are inexperienced in financial management or would tend to waste the principal in a shortsighted splurge of consumption, maximum benefit to the living cannot always
be secured by ceding unfettered control of property to the donee. 91 An objective, facts-and-circumstances evaluation of the needs and capabilities of each
trust beneficiary, devisee, or legatee of property would be necessary to assure
that property is applied to the maximum advantage of donees. Such an individualized inquiry would clearly overwhelm the judicial system. Hence, the
settlor/testator's dispositive plan is followed for reasons of judicial economy-as an administrable proxy or surrogate for the preferred approach,
namely, a disinterested utilitarian evaluation of how the property can be applied to best promote the welfare of each donee.
According to this view, trusts and future interests are tolerated because
the donor, who is personally familiar with the weaknesses, strengths, needs,
and capacities of his donees, and who is generally not as interested a party as
the donees, is presumed to act out of a concern for the best interests of the
donees.92 And dead-hand control may subsist only for one generation and the
minority of the next because restrictions, conditions or limitations that extend
beyond that period cannot be founded on an individual determination of the
needs and capacities of persons with whom the donor was personally acbelongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what
proceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct." Sidgwick, in his Elements of Politics, also discusses the problem in the following words: ". . . it
rather follows from the fundamental assumption of individualism, that any
such posthumous restraint on the use of bequeathed wealth will tend to make
it less useful to the living, as it will interfere with their freedom in dealing
with it. Individualism, in short, is in a dilemma. . . .Of this difficulty, there
is, I think, no general theoretical solution: it can only be reduced by some
practical compromise."
Id. at 59-60 (footnotes omitted); accord RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY Introductory
Note on the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, at 2131-32 (1944).
91. Similarly, a rule requiring that all donative transfers be devoted to the
purchase of an inalienable life annuity, although it would secure professional management and protect the donee from his own improvidence, is unacceptable because it is
equally inflexible. In many circumstances greater benefit would be obtained by transferring unfettered control of the property, as, for example, where a lump sum is needed
to buy a house or cover large educational or medical expenses, or where the donee is a
sophisticated investor.

92. A. GULLIVER,

FUTURE INTERESTS
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quainted. Where the presumption that the donor's limitations are designed to
93
best promote the welfare of donees breaks down, it should not be followed.
Thus in theory, the plan of the settlor/testator is entitled to no independent
respect, its only significance is as a handy substitute for the prohibitively expensive independent evaluation.
It is noteworthy that this donor-as-proxy rationale for the Rule Against
Perpetuities is responsive to one of the criticisms of the productivity rationale.
It was suggested earlier that the principal economic incentive to accumulate
wealth beyond one's own ability to consume is secured by a policy of free
testation--determining which friends and relatives shall benefit from one's
property and in what amounts. The significance of any incremental incentive
that may derive from the donor's ability to control the terms and conditions of
the donee's enjoyment of property seems much more questionable. 9 4 Under the
donor-as-proxy rationale, the idiosyncratic (and, perhaps, misanthropic)
desires of the settlor/testator are carried out during the period of the Rule,
but in theory they are dispensable-society would substitute a judicial or administrative determination if we could afford it.
Missouri's new trust variation statute may portend a new attitude-that
in some circumstances society can and should afford an independent judicial
determination of how to best advance the welfare of trust beneficiaries. If the
competent adult beneficiaries are unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the
settlor's plan, perhaps an independent judicial inquiry is warranted. This, too,
may be a situation where the presumption that the donor's limitations are
designed to best promote the welfare of the donees breaks down.
Most substantial noncharitable transfers of wealth in modern society are
accomplished through the use of trusts. Thus it might at first appear that the
broad view of judicial discretion presented here creates the potential for an
endless stream of litigation, completely undercutting the judicial economy
sought to be obtained by society's acceptance of future interests and trusts.
For several reasons the expansive interpretation of Missouri's trust variation
statute is not a rejection of the principle that the transaction costs of independent evaluation generally require reliance on the settlor's plan. In most situations the beneficiaries could not obtain judicial reappraisal of the trust. Jurisdiction should not be exercised if the settlor is still on the scene.9 5 And because
jurisdiction is conditioned on the consent of all adult beneficiaries who are not
disabled, the flood of litigation which reliance on the settlor's plan was
designed to avert should not materialize. Finally, even where the unanimity
requirement is satisfied, it will often be clear that variation would not be
granted, as, for example, where beneficiaries who are demonstrably irresponsible with money seek to terminate a spendthrift trust.
93. Id.; A. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND
RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS § 121 (2d ed. 1920).

94. See supra text accompanying note 84.
95. See supra note 87.
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Indirect Consequences of the Broad View

If Missouri courts adopt the expansive interpretation of their new distributive variation authority suggested here, an indirect consequence may be the
eventual modification of other legal rules. In particular, two common-law rules
ancillary to the Rule Against Perpetuities may, over time, change or whither
away. These are (1) the rule against perpetually indestructible trusts, and (2)
the rule against accumulations."
The rule against perpetually indestructible trusts demands that a trust
must be terminable at the consent of all beneficiaries once the perpetuities
period of lives in being plus twenty-one years has run. 97 This rule would be
more appropriately designated the "limit on Claflin trusts," for its sole function is to assure that control over trust assets is eventually transferred to the
beneficiaries notwithstanding the settlor's purposes. 98 While the existence of
such a rule in jurisdictions that follow Claflin is undisputed, the consequences
of a violation of the rule are less clear. Violation of the rule does not void the
trust or any beneficial interest therein, only the indestructibility feature. The
older authorities indicate that a perpetual restriction on consensual termination is void ab initio, leaving the beneficiaries free to modify or terminate the
trust from the moment of its inception, while the more recent authorities
would hold the restraint valid for the duration of the perpetuities period,
96. The number of decisions actually resting on the rule against perpetually
indestructible trusts or the rule against accumulations is quite small. This is because
most trusts or accumulations that may endure too long involve one or more trust interests that are to remain contingent until termination. As such remotely vesting interests
are void under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, the question of an interestholder's right to terminate the trust or accumulation does not arise. Accordingly, these
rules come into play only in the rare circumstance where all interests vest within the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities but the trust terms provide for termination at
some later date (i.e., postponed distribution of vested interests). The prevailing modem
practice of terminating a trust upon expiration of a perpetuities saving clause virtually
guarantees the continued scarcity of authority (and, it must be admitted, the minimal
practical importance) of the issues discussed in this portion of the article.
97. See generally Downing, supra note 68, at 372-91.
98. Professor Gray predicted that the decision in Claflin would necessitate the
development of such a rule, and speculated that the courts would adopt the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities as the maximum duration of trust indestructibility.
The fact is that the Massachusetts court in Claflin v. Claflin introduced a
novel idea into the law, that of the inalienability of absolute interests, just as
the Court of King's Bench in Pells v. Brown introduced a novel idea into the
law, that of the indestructibility of future interests. And as the Rule against
Perpetuities had to be invented to control the indestructible future interests
created by Pells v. Brown, so some rule must be invented to control the inalienable interests created by Claflin v. Claflin. It is perhaps likely that the
same period as that prescribed by the Rule against Perpetuities will be taken,
although it would seem quite open to the Court to adopt some other period, if
found more convenient.
J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 121i (2d ed. 1906) (footnotes omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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merely "lopping-off" any excessive period of dead-hand control. 91
Designed, as it is, "to prevent the possible undesirable social consequences
of the views of persons long removed from the current scene influencing unduly the wishes and desires of those living in the present,"100 the rule against
perpetually indestructible trusts might become a dead letter if Missouri courts
adopt the broad view of their trust variation authority. If a trust can be modified or terminated within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities on the
assent of the court and all adult beneficiaries who are not disabled, the living
have control of their own destiny at all times.210 Perhaps a bright-line cut-off
of the Claflin doctrine is not needed where an individualized judicial determination of the continuing vitality of the trust is readily available. To the contrary, it could be argued that the beneficiaries should not have to bear the cost
of securing judicial assent to termination once the perpetuities period has expired, and that such continuing judicial supervision could enforce, beyond the
perpetuities period, the "views of persons long removed from the scene." Yet
the court would enforce those views only if it found that the proposed change
was not in the best interests of the beneficiaries, and in this circumstance,
where the views of persons long removed have received contemporary judicial
validation, the wishes of the beneficiaries would not seem to be "unduly"
influenced.
The common-law rule against accumulations, which holds that a provision
in the trust instrument directing or permitting the trustee to retain all or a
part of the trust income for a period that exceeds the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities is partially or completely ineffective, 10 2 is also a close rel99. Downing, supra note 68, at 383-84. The void-ab-initio approach is consistent with the consequence of a violation of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,

while the lopping-off approach corresponds to the "wait and see" reform of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) §

2.1 & comments a-c (1983). The American Law Institute has recommended adoption
of the lopping-off approach. Id.;

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 62 comment o

(1959) ("such a provision [preventing consensual termination] is ineffective so far as it
is applicable beyond the period [of lives in being and twenty-one years], and is wholly
ineffective unless it is severable").
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 2.1 comment a (1983).
101. This statement assumes that the Missouri courts would construe their trust
variation jurisdiction to encompass the case where all trust beneficiaries are competent,
consenting adults.
102. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 339, 441(1) (1944). The statement in the
text, that the duty or authority to accumulate is "partially or completely ineffective," is
intentionally indefinite. The exact consequences of a violation of the rule against accumulations is uncertain, reflecting the same uncertainty that surrounds the violation of

the rule against perpetually indestructible trusts. See supra note 99. Here, too, the
older authorities indicate that the trust term sanctioning an excessive accumulation is
void ab initio, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 441(1) (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 62 comment t (1959); see 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 67, § 1468,
while the more recent authorities would inialidate the accumulation only to the extent
that it extends beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, BOGERT supra note
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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ative of the Claflin doctrine. A trust providing for mandatory or discretionary
accumulation of income is necessarily a Claflin trust, there being an obvious
"material purpose" to increase the fund. Professor Simes observed that "to the
extent that the Claflin doctrine is not in force, the application of Saunders v.
Vautier will enable the beneficiary to stop the accumulation in nearly all cases
[by demanding termination], and thus render it unobjectionable.'' 1 3 The theory is that, if the beneficiary has the power to terminate the trust, continued
accumulation resulting from forebearance in the exercise of that power is
merely voluntary saving by the beneficiary; as a matter of policy the accumu-

lation is not objectionable because it is not enforced by the dead."'
Professor Simes concluded, on the basis of these considerations, that an
independent rule against accumulations is unnecessary if the trust is destructible, either because the Claflin doctrine is not in force or because its duration is
limited by the rule against perpetually indestructible trusts. 0 5 Accordingly, if
Missouri's trust variation statute is construed broadly, Missouri courts may
similarly conclude that the rule against accumulations is unnecessary, since all
trusts would be terminable
at any time upon an appropriate agreement among
10 6
adult beneficiaries.
To summarize, Missouri courts may conclude that an expansive interpretation of judicial trust variation authority is sufficient to assure that resources
held in trust will be reasonably responsive to changing circumstance that may
6, § 217 at 288; RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS)

§

2.2(1) comments f & g (1983) (using "wait and see" to determine whether accumulation endures too long).
103. L. SIMES, supra note 68, at 108; accord W. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND
433-35 (1955).
104. L. SIMES, supra note 68, at 97-99; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 2.2 comment e (1983); 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra
OTHER RESTRAINTS

note 67, § 1462. This justification of the rule against accumulations, that it is designed
to prohibit control of resources by persons too long removed from the current scene,
may call into question the principle that a trustee's discretionaryauthority to accumulate is subject to the rule, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 439 comment b (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS)

§ 2.2 comment g, Illus-

trations 4 & 5 (1983), because such a power makes the utilization of resources
responsive to current conditions (even if not responsive to the whims of current beneficiaries). On the other hand, if the trustee's exercise of discretion is subject to standards
or guidelines imposed by the settlor, such continuing, unresponsive dead-hand influence
may be as objectionable as outright control.
105. L. SIMEs, supra note 68, at 105-08; 3 L. SImES & A. SMITH, supra note 67,
§ 1465: "Perhaps it is enough that the courts will hold ineffective a provision for indestructibility if the period of indestructibility is to last longer than the period of the rule
against perpetuities." This line of reasoning indicates that the rule against accumulations is redundant.
106. As used here, "appropriate" means deserving of judicial assent under the
standards discussed earlier. That is, the arrangement is such that the court could find
that (1) protected beneficiaries will "benefit," (2) it is a good bargain for the protected
beneficiaries, and (3) it serves the best interests of the adult beneficiaries who are not
disabled.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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face current and future beneficiaries. Thus, the new trust variation jurisdiction
may undercut the utility of the rule against perpetually indestructible trusts
and the rule against accumulations. A different result is possible, however.
Attention to the justification that underlies the broad view of judicial authority
might impel the courts to reexamine and reformulate these rules ancillary to
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Recall that the broad view of trust variation authority is founded upon a
unique conception of the policy against perpetuities-that in order to keep
transaction costs within reasonable bounds the law adopts the donor's limitations as a surrogate for an independent beneficiary-by-beneficiary determination of how property should be applied to best promote the welfare of the
living. This second-best approach to donative transfers ought to be followed
only insofar as it is reasonable to assume that the donor's limitations were
designed to promote the welfare of her beneficiaries. If conditions and limitations extending beyond one generation and the minority of the next are void
because they cannot be founded on an individual determination of the needs
and capacities of persons with whom the donor was personally acquainted,
why should a Claflin trust or an accumulation endure for a greater period
whenever a single beneficiary wishes to continue it? Some or all of the vested
remainder beneficiaries of a trust may indeed need spendthrift protection, or
professional management, or income accumulation extending beyond age
twenty-one, but the donor could not possibly know that.
The broad view of trust variation jurisdiction transfers greater control
over resources to the living, but it never grants unilateral control to any beneficiary-a change requires unanimous consent by all adult beneficiaries who are
not disabled together with judicial approval. The unanimity requirement
means that every adult beneficiary holds a veto power over the proposed variation. 10 7 In the interests of judicial economy this requirement is appropriate
107. The American Law Institute would apply a separate-share rule, treating a
trust with multiple principal beneficiaries as so many separate trusts, each independently terminable with the consent of all persons having an interest in either the income or principal of that portion of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
(DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 2.1 comment i (1983); Casner, Discussion of Restatement of
Law, Second, Property, Tentative Draft No. 2-Part , 56 A.L.I. PROC. 493, 510-11
(1979). Under this approach agreement with another beneficiary would be required to
obtain possession of resources held in trust only in the relatively unusual circumstance
in which vested income and principal interests are held by distinct persons after the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities has run. For example, if T devises property in
trust with income to be paid to S for life, then to the youngest son of S for life, with
principal to be distributed to D, the life income interest in the youngest son of S must
vest within a life in being, but the trust may extend beyond the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Here, agreement between S's youngest son and D, holders of the
vested income and principal interests, would be required to terminate the trust after the
perpetuities period has run. But if T devised the property in trust to S for life, then to
the children of S, with principal to be distributed when the youngest child attains the
age of forty, then under the Restatement rule the children could independently demand
possession of their separate shares of the trust once the perpetuities period has run.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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during the perpetuitiesperiod, for it serves to screen out the egregious cases in
which the presumption that the donor acted to best promote the welfare of her
beneficiaries breaks down. Beyond the perpetuities period there can be no such
presumption. The continuance of a Claflin trust may serve the interests of
some beneficiary, thereby preventing termination under the trust variation
statute, but what warrant is that for tying the hands of the rest?
More consistent with the objective approach of the Rule Against Perpetuities and its underlying rationale would be a simple corollary: a Claflin trust is
terminable at the request of any beneficiary once the perpetuities period has
run.108 If all vested remainder beneficiaries are satisfied, the trust could of
course continue, but disagreement should not stand in the way of individual
autonomy once there is no longer any reason to resolve that disagreement by
deferring to the settlor's plan.
III.

CONCLUSION

Missouri courts will have substantial leeway in construing the scope of
their new jurisdiction to permit variation from the distributive terms of a trust.
The statute is susceptible to a variety of interpretations, ranging from a limited cy pres power over private trusts to an unprecedented grant of jurisdiction
to revise settlements to serve the best interests of all beneficiaries whenever the
adult beneficiaries agree that the settlor's arrangements are unsatisfactory.
Missouri courts will quite properly be guided by the actions of the courts of
Notice that if the separate-share approach is not followed, then by the simple expedient of making the professional trustee, whose interest is in earning management
fees from continuance of the trust, a minor beneficiary under the trust, the settlor can
virtually guarantee that unanimous consent to termination will not be forthcoming.
This device can be used to make a trust indestructible as a practical matter in jurisdictions (including England and the Commonwealth nations) that do not recognize the
Claflin doctrine. Downing, supra note 68, at 380-81; Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L. J. 393, 404 (1933).
108. This reformulation of the rule against perpetually indestructible trusts was
advocated by Downing, supra note 68, at 379-83, but on the ground that the problem
to which the Rule Against Perpetuities is directed is the investment conservatism of
trustees. This is also the form which Professor Albert M. Kales, writing in 1920, assumed that the rule against perpetually indestructible trusts would take. A. KALES,
supra note 93, § 658, at 754-55.
The American Law Institute, in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY,
adopts the curiously ambivalent position that (subject to the separate-share rule described supra note 107) an agreement among multiple beneficiaries is necessary to terminate a Claflin trust once the perpetuities period has run, but an accumulation extending beyond that time is simply invalid, without regard to the beneficiaries' wishes.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 2.1 (1983)
with id. § 2.2(l); see 56 A.L.I. PROC. 520-21 (colloquy between Mr. Richard Wellman
and Prof. James Casner). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 441(2) & comment
h (1944) (where a single person has unrestricted power to terminate an accumulation
the period during which such power subsists is not taken into account in determining
whether the accumulation may last too long).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/6
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England and certain British Commonwealth countries in construing similar
legislation. On many questions-including the relevance of indirect or nonpecuniary benefits, insistence upon a good bargain, and the authority to override the settlor's purposes-the decisions from abroad are quite persuasive and
deserve to be followed. But in addition, the grant of judicial discretion under
section 456.590.2 confers a flexibility which presents Missouri courts with a
singular opportunity (an opportunity not seized, thus far, by their English and
Commonwealth brethren) to enunciate a unique conception of the policy
against perpetuities. Indeed, the scope of judicial discretion must be determined either by adherence to tradition, or by an informed evaluation of the
function of the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Supreme Court has observed
that "the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance."' 0 9 With the enactment of broad discretionary authority to vary the distributive terms of a private trust, the time has come to reexamine the wisdom of that sufferance, and
perhaps, to loosen the dead hand's grip.

109.

Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
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